Russell Kimmel
Dr. Ken Kerr
EN101-16
6 Dec. 2011
Private Military Contractors: Paying for Poor Performance
To many people, Iraq is a war fought like any other war. But in truth, the war is a test of privatizing the military, a test that contractors have failed. At some points during the occupation, there were more private military contractors than U.S troops. Even at this high concentration of contractors to support the military, they still have failed to adequately supplement the U.S. forces, while also causing significant damage to foreign relations and at a high cost to the government. Private military contractors harm the United States in the long run by ruining foreign relations, weakening the United States’ armed forces, and wasting taxpayers’ money.
Private military contractors hurt foreign relations by mistreating Iraqis, causing anger against the U.S. For security purposes, contractor convoys sometimes drive counter flow, in other words, northbound on a southbound road (Fainaru 115). Another problem is contractors also drive very aggressively, running other cars off the road (Rasor and Bauman 68). In one case, a Blackwater convoy ran eighteen vehicles off the road in one trip (Fainaru 164). During these convoys, contractors also have a tendency to fire on suspicious cars or civilians on the sides of the streets (“Mercenaries”). For example, Blackwater employees killed three people by firing on a taxi, with one of the people killed not even being in the car (Fainaru 139). In another case, a Crescent Security convoy shot at a truck and killed two Iraqi police officers (Fainaru 65). In one Kellog, Brown, and Root (KBR) convoy, the truck leader told his convoy guards to shoot any cars that got too close, even if they had families in them (Rasor and Bauman 121). Because of their driving conduct and pointing their weapons at bystanders, Blackwater convoys made enemies basically every trip (Scahill 71). An unnamed Iraqi security official at the Ministry of the Interior sums up what negative connotations contractors bring other Americans:
They are part of the reason for all the hatred that is directed at Americans, because people don’t know them as Blackwater, they know them only as Americans. Blackwater has no respect for the Iraqi people. They consider Iraqis like animals, although actually I think they have more respect for animals. We have seen what they do in the streets. When they’re not shooting, they’re throwing water bottles at people and calling them names. If you are terrifying a child or elderly woman, or you are killing an innocent civilian who is riding in his car, isn’t that terrorism?(qtd. in Fainaru 140)
Finally, one contractor even admits that he believes the actions of his company enrage the Iraqi populace (Rasor and Bauman 127).
Contractors also hurt foreign relations by not having rules of engagement and not being bound by the international rules of war. The contractors are restrained by two rules, no offensive fighting and escalation of force on approaching vehicles, and sometimes contractors ignore both of these regulations (Pelton 215). Contractors are not bound by the international laws of war because they are not defined in the rules. The existing law works off of two actors, the soldier and the civilian. Contractors are a mix between the two, meaning neither set of laws can apply to them (Mandernach). Because of Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17, contractors could not even be prosecuted for the heinous acts stated earlier for most of the Iraq war. This order, issued by Ambassador Paul Bremer, prevents contractors from being prosecuted under Iraqi law (Scahill xx; Fainaru 136). In one instance, a contractor named Moonen was drinking one night and shot one of the Vice President of Iraq’s bodyguards, and he was only punished by being shipped out of Iraq the next day (Fainaru 165). Following this incident, The President and the Secretary of Defense both had no idea when asked about how contractors could be prosecuted for their crimes (Fainaru 25). Only recently has an agreement between the U.S. and Iraq allowed contractors to be tried under Iraqi law (Lam).
Another detractor to foreign affairs is the lack of government oversight for contractors, in effect meaning the government does not even know what it’s paying for. The government has not placed any oversight mechanisms to monitor contractor performance, but the U. S. embassy maintains that it has delegated officials to monitor performance. Yet in truth, these officials are not required and are not inclined to oversee contract performance, basically because it would mean more work (Singer 239). Even the Government Oversight Administration (the investigative office of Congress) employees assigned to this task are poorly trained and fail to notice contractors taking advantage of the government (Singer 154). One contractor even claimed that the government had no right to monitor its actions or inspect its work (Rasor and Bauman 87-88). During a meeting to discuss their poor performance, KBR lied to the Army about following regulations that were in place (Rasor and Bauman 19). One officer in Iraq says that Blackwater can basically do whatever it wants and get away with it (Fainaru 138). As Dr. Hammes, retired Marine Corp officer and Senior Research Fellow in the Strategic Research Center, says,"Unless it provides a government officer or noncommissioned officer for each construction project, convoy, personal security detail, or facilities-protection unit, the government does not control, or even know about, their daily interactions" (Hammes).
Because of all the bad feelings and bad press, the United States’ foreign relations are hurt when the U.S. is forced to defend contractors from both the public and insurgents. Whenever the public asks critical questions about contractors, the government cannot answer them because of the poor oversight (Fainaru 25). In legal battles, Blackwater consistently hides behind legislation that prevents the Army from being sued by former employees’ families (Eviatar). As for defending contractors against insurgents, all contractors’ convoy trucks are supposed to have a panic button in them. When a contactor presses the panic button, the button sends a signal to the Army. The Army in turn organizes a response. These responses make the U.S. look weak because they have to defend those whom they are paying for defense (Fainaru 99). U. S. forces also react whenever contractors are killed. For example, the long and bloody campaign to pacify Fallujah was caused by the death of four Blackwater contractors (Scahill 10; Bennett).
Further damaging foreign relations is the fact that contactors recruit from countries with bad reputations and questionable sources. For instance, Blackwater has hired commandos from Chile, who served under the brutal military dictatorship of General Pinochet (Scahill 192; Spencer). In like manner, a subsidiary of Blackwater recruits troops from the Philippines, Nepal, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, and Peru, many of whom have poor records when it comes to observing human rights (Scahill xxiii). At one point, Military Professional Resources Inc. hired an entire unit of Spetznaz, Russian Special Forces known for their brutal training and tactics (Singer 84). In one tragic case, Crescent Security hired local Iraqis, who later turned on their employer and kidnapped and killed six other contractors, without even a background check before employment (Fainaru 49, 63). Moonen, mentioned earlier for his unpunished actions, was rehired by a Kuwaiti contractor only two months after his incident (Fainaru 167). KBR hired foreign drivers, some of which had never driven large trucks before, to run convoys from Kuwait to Iraq. Sometimes these foreign drivers steal the goods by simply leaving the convoy and driving off into the desert (Rasor and Bauman 66). In regards to recruitment, Geoff Clark, security manager for shipping contractor Agility, says in a comment about warehouse guards in Umm Qasr that, ”you’ve got some who are very professional, and others I wouldn’t let protect a cup of [urine]” (qtd. in Fainaru 142).
One major argument of proponents of private military contractors is the ability to free up soldiers to do their primary job, which is to engage in combat. Most importantly, contractors run the supply lines for the military, for instance delivering food, parts, and ammunition to forward operating bases (Hammes). In other settings, contractors perform maintenance on high tech equipment, such as specialized electronics and aircraft carrier systems, that our servicemen now lack the expertise to do (Hedahl).Another job contractors fulfill is the training of local forces, such as the training of the new Iraqi army (Hartung).Contractors also perform translation and interrogation for various agencies (Lam). Finally, contractors fill the role of an extremely flexible workforce, almost like a temp agency for soldiers. When needed, more contractors can be hired to fill positions, and when the need for their services is no longer required, the contractors are let go (Hammes). While proponents see these attributes as beneficial, some actively weaken the United States military by stealing jobs, taking, troops, and damaging morale.
Tasks normally completed by U. S. troops are taken by contractors. These contractors do not necessarily do a better job than servicemen, and certainly cannot be replaced for nonperformance like servicemen can (Rasor and Bauman 46). Under the new system of contractor logistics, the Army has to complain to and plead with contractors to do their jobs, and sometimes they still do not complete their work (Rasor and Bauman 35). Because of the supply shortages caused by the lack of work, many troops had to scavenge for food, water, and parts to survive and keep operational (Rasor and Bauman 33). If a run is too risky or the government is a little slow with payment, contractors are allowed to refuse to do their jobs without penalties. While contractors can adopt this type of policy, if a soldier tried to refuse, he would be court-martialed and sent to prison (Singer 159; Rasor and Bauman 1).
Another factor weakening the military is contractors draw troops away from the armed forces. In some cases the incentive of being paid more than six times the amount of their current salary is too much for soldiers, and they leave the military to join a contractor (Quirk). On the other hand, certain contractors actively influence soldiers to leave the military, much to the dismay of their commanders (Scahill 154). As a result, some people use military service simply to meet the requirements of becoming a contractor (Singer 204).
Another way the U.S. military is weakened by contractors is the damage caused to morale. Troops are demoralized by the high pay of contractors and their almost unlimited freedom. These differences also create dissent among the troops, weakening unit cohesiveness (Singer 197). Contractor’s actions can also adversely affect the attitude of the troops (Rasor and Bauman 80). Contractors also demoralize troops by their immunity from the law. Whereas the soldiers would be tried under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the contractors receive no punishment (Eviatar). Soldiers are also demoralized by the lack of supplies, supplies that never reached them because of contractor’s poor performance (Rasor and Bauman 34).
While private military contractors harm the U.S. by weakening the United States’ armed forces, they also waste a great deal of taxpayers’ money by inflation, waste, and fraud.
On average, individual employees are paid upwards of six-hundred dollars a day (Scahill xx). Despite this information, proponents of contractors state that the concept saves money. They try to back up with the fact that there is no training or long term costs associated with per contract employees (Cancian). Others say that the competitive nature of bidding brings down costs (Schreier). The fact is that the contractors lasting nature means that their high prices for expedience will cost more money in the long run (Singer 180). Furthermore there is evidence that the bidding is only offered to one company, so there is no competition (Isenberg).
The first way contractors waste money is by inflating the prices of their services to get more money out of the United States government. Contractors inflate their prices by taking advantage of their cost-plus contracts. The profits gained from these contracts are a percentage, usually one or two, of how much a contractor spends completing a contract. Because profit is percentage based, contractors do not need or want to look for a cheaper price when buying supplies or finishing a job (Rasor and Bauman 22). The leading supply contractor KBR (Spencer) leases SUVs from a Kuwaiti company they are aligned with for seventy-five hundred dollars a month, more than five times the normal amount (Rasor and Bauman 17).
Because of the cost-plus contract, contractors are almost encouraged to waste money on the procurement of supplies. KBR is notorious for buying broken or subpar equipment. They buy uninspected trucks for convoys and discover later that the trucks do not even run (Rasor and Bauman 16-17). KBR also wastes money on buying equipment from blacklisted sources or sanctioned countries (Singer 142). In one case of buying soft serve ice cream machines, KBR bought nonfunctional machines from Iran, then bought new ones from Kuwait, and billed the U.S. Army for both of the shipments. KBR also buys unnecessary food products like Neer Beer (Rasor and Bauman 142). Over a billion dollars has been wasted by KBR at the Theater Distribution Mission and two million dollars a week are lost to mismanagement of supplies (Rasor and Bauman 39).
In another effort to increase cost, contractors encourage their employees to over clock their hours. KBR employees at one point clocked 120 hour work weeks, but the Army complained about high incurred labor costs. Now KBR employees clock eighty-four hours a week, the equivalent of working twelve hours a day, seven days a week. (Rasor and Bauman 14).These same employees are known to only work two hours a day, then simply sit around (Rasor and Bauman 41).
As a result of the blatant profiteering attitude, some contractors bill the Department of Defense for activities they did not do. On one particular base, KBR ran a recycling project and simply threw the recycling in the burn pit with the normal trash, while charging more for the recycling service (Peter). KBR also fails in its duty to repair air conditioning systems. Sergeant Gary M. Davenport, in Iraq at Camp Speicher, says “It seems KBR, at the administrative level, has found a way to get paid for a job without ever having to do it” (qtd. in Rasor and Bauman 138-9). Custer Battles, a relatively small company with large contracts, created its own subsidiaries to charge to, and then added on their own charges and billed the government (Rasor and Bauman 89). Custer Battles also received payment for a contract that was cancelled before it began (Rasor and Bauman 86).
Despite the outrageous profit, some contractors still do a substandard job when they do fulfill a contract. For example, DynCorp was hired to train the new Iraqi police force, and sent contractors that had no police or military training (Griffin 284). Later, when supplying actual officers for another operation, DynCorp sent in overweight and overage employees (Singer 153). In like manner, KBR convoys often do not make it to their drop off points because of poor maintenance, but KBR is still paid for the delivery (Rasor and Bauman 66-67).
Contractors waste money, weaken the military, and vilify and discredit America on the world stage. The contractors make a mockery of an honorable profession, a mockery that damages the United States as whole and its military. These abuses will continue unchecked unless the government steps up and regulates the contractors thoroughly and decisively. The government must force the contractors to perform, and recover the funds stolen from them. Only then soldiers can be content they are being provided for, and Americans can feel confident that they are being protected.
